The U.S. Senate held a commission meeting on Friday to review the Afghanistan War, focusing on the period from 2001 to 2008.

Several high-ranking U.S. policymakers, generals, and former Afghan officials attended the meeting. Important questions regarding the early years of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan were addressed.

Shamila Chaudhary, co-chair of the Afghanistan War Commission, said the meeting focused on the early years of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, specifically from 2001 to 2008.

Chaudhary stated: “In this century, we launched two wars beyond our borders — in Iraq and Afghanistan. These wars were debated, justified, and criticized. This session, and the broader mission of this commission, is not about judging the past. It is about learning from it. The war in Afghanistan has never had simple conclusions. But that doesn’t mean we should avoid trying to understand it. If we do not analyze what happened in Afghanistan, we risk turning the war into an abstract concept.”

In the meeting, General David Barno, former U.S. commander in Afghanistan, pointed to a lack of coordination and continuity in U.S. military leadership as reasons for the country’s failure in Afghanistan.

“I want to highlight three key factors that, in my view, undermined America’s chances of success in Afghanistan over two decades: first, the persistent inability to effectively integrate U.S. political, military, diplomatic, and economic efforts. Second, the rapid turnover in U.S. military and diplomatic leadership in Afghanistan over 20 years. Third, the mishandling of external safe havens such as Pakistan,” said Barno.

Andrew Natsios, former director of USAID, said in his remarks that the U.S. government’s goals in Afghanistan were never reconciled because they were mutually exclusive and contradictory.

Natsios stated: “Policymakers in Washington assumed that by spending vast sums of money, they could achieve good and positive outcomes in Afghanistan. But over time, it became clear that these decisions were misguided and worsened the situation. The U.S. military and Afghan politicians saw progress only in construction projects, whereas real progress lay in building and strengthening institutions.”

Meanwhile, Shamila Chaudhary also emphasized the importance of listening to the views of Afghanistan’s partners when addressing key questions about reconciliation with the Islamic Emirate and forming strategies on the Afghanistan issue.

It is also noteworthy that two former officials of the previous Afghan government attended this meeting and shared their perspectives on the mistakes and failures of both the U.S. and the former Afghan government.